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The problematic of biopolitics has become increasingly important in the social sciences. 
Starting from Michel Foucault’s genealogies of governance of sexuality, crime and mental 
illness in modern Europe, which marked the shift from negative and repressive techniques 
of sovereign power towards the positive and productive power over life, the research on 
biopolitics has developed into a wider interdisciplinary orientation, addressing the 
rationalities of power over living beings in diverse spatial and temporal contexts.  
  
While biopolitics is conventionally understood as positive and productive, numerous studies 
of biopolitics, both theoretical and empirical, suggest that this claim is by no means 
unproblematic. Biopolitics is inherently paradoxical, in that its ambition to ‘make live’, to 
foster, augment and optimize life, remains intertwined with its apparent opposite, the 
negative power of exclusion and annihilation. While this conversion of biopolitics into 
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'thanatopolitics' was noted already in Foucault's History of Sexuality I, its full implications 
have been elaborated in the more recent theories of Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito 
and other authors. These studies demonstrate that the association of the positive power 
over life with the negative power of death is hardly coincidental but rather lies at the heart 
of the biopolitical project. While the interpretations of this conjunction of the powers of life 
and death are certainly diverse and resort to ontological, anthropological, historical and 
ideological arguments, they clearly demonstrate that the problematic of biopolitics may no 
longer be viewed in terms of a simple temporal succession from the dark age of sovereign 
negativity to the glorious age of positive power that makes life live. Bio-power, however we 
define it, is always already a power of life and death, not only in the sense that fostering the 
life of some presupposes the death of others, but also in the more ominous sense that the 
life fostered, amplified and optimized in biopolitical practices remains in proximity to death 
precisely by virtue of being enfolded in an apparatus of power, whose biopolitical 
productivity does not exclude sovereign negativity.  
 
This understanding of biopolitics introduces a range of problems for critical research. Insofar 
as it is no longer meaningful to simply oppose biopower to sovereignty as the positive to the 
negative, what does the task of critique consist in? Is it a matter of attempting to dissociate 
the powers of life and death, to free biopolitics from its constituent negativity? What does it 
mean to speak of a ‘positive’ or ‘affirmative’ biopolitics given the intertwining of the powers 
of life and death? Can biopolitics be affirmative, unless what one affirms in it is precisely 
death itself? Alternatively, if a biopolitics without negativity and death is impossible, should 
criticism aim at exiting the biopolitical terrain as such? Yet, if this terrain now embraces life 
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as such, spilling over into all possible domains of existence, where exactly would an exit 
from biopolitics take us?  
 
This Special Issue ventures to begin to respond to this challenge by reconsidering the 
relation between bio- and thanato-politics through theoretical and empirical investigations 
of their paradoxical entanglement. This set of articles is based on the papers originally 
presented at the conference ‘Powers of Life and Death’, funded by the Academy of Finland, 
that I organized at the University of Helsinki in November 2012. This conference brought 
together scholars with highly diverse disciplinary backgrounds and approaches to 
biopolitics. The intention was to avoid starting from any particular definition or approach to 
biopolitics and instead take up the problem of the thanatopolitical conversion at the most 
different sites imaginable: Socratic ethics, socialist revolution and AIDS prevention, to name 
just a few. Despite this diversity, the papers presented here share a strong theoretical 
conviction about the impossibility of separating the positive and negative aspects of 
biopolitics, the persistence of the thanatopolitical even in the contexts we are most 
accustomed to associate with the affirmation and care of life and the consequent need to 
problematize our familiar assumptions about the relation of politics to life.  
 
The Issue opens with Mika Ojakangas’s genealogy of the Western biopolitical subject. 
Sharing Agamben’s insistence on the ancient origins of biopolitics, Ojakangas nonetheless 
contests Agamben’s famous presentation of the originary figure of the biopolitical subject as 
homo sacer, a human being that can be killed with impunity. He argues that the paradigm of 
such a subject is rather best sought in the Socratic figure of erēmos aporos, an abandoned 
and forlorn being that dwells as a refugee in his own city, not because of being excluded by 
4 
 
others but as a result of his self-exclusion in response to the voice of his conscience. Yet, 
while the Socratic subject of conscience is seemingly a less ominous figure than homo sacer, 
this mode of subjectivity remains directly and immediately thanatopolitical, albeit in the 
sense of ‘symbolic death’ or social suicide. It is by risking symbolic death by following only 
the call of one’s conscience and excluding oneself from the polis that the Socratic subject is 
able to assume sovereignty over his bare life. The figures of sovereign and homo sacer that 
were symmetrical in Agamben’s argument thus end up fused into a single figure of a 
‘sovereign homo sacer’, a being that dominates its own bare life, but only at the price of 
negating it. 
 
Prozorov’s article addresses the fundamental paradox of biopolitics in the context of the 
Stalinist period of Soviet history. Despite the omission of the case of Stalinism from the 
studies of biopolitics, this phenomenon is a particularly powerful example of the 
thanatopolitical conversion of biopolitics due to its combination of an extremely ambitious 
programme of the positive transformation of almost every aspect of human existence in 
accordance with the Marxist ideology and an equally extremely violent project of the 
negation of the very same lives that were to be positively transformed. Through a 
systematic comparison of the Stalinist biopolitical rationality with both liberal and Nazi 
governmentalities, we arrive at the formulation of the Stalinist project in terms of the 
conjunction of the immanentist transformation of lived reality, characteristic of all 
biopolitics, and the revolutionary-messianic drive for the transcendence of reality as it is. 
While both liberalism and Nazism could be conceived as ‘immunitary’ projects of securing 
and protecting life, albeit negatively and violently, the Stalinist project of the construction of 
socialism as a lived reality may be grasped as counter-immunitary, forcing the idea of 
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socialism into the real by forcing out those aspects of the real that conflict with it, 
abandoning any concern with security or protection. The article traces this paradoxical and 
paroxysmal logic in an empirical analysis of the period of the Great Break (1928-1932), 
marked by the most intense thanatopolitical violence and the subsequent partial negation 
of this project under High Stalinism. 
 
Repo’s contribution addresses a key transformation in the biopolitical rationality of the 20th 
century, the invention of gender as a mechanism of the biopolitical control of the body. 
With the emergence of the category of gender, sexuality was no longer determined either 
biologically or psychologically but rather reinterpreted in terms of gender roles, effects of 
socialization into normative behavioral patterns. While the abandonment of biological 
determinism may at first glance appear to be emancipatory, Repo demonstrates how it is 
precisely the understanding of gender as a ‘social construct’ that provided new mechanisms 
for disciplining sexual behaviors. While following Foucault’s precepts about the positivity 
and productivity of power, Repo also traces the negative or even thanatopolitical aspects of 
the production of gender, focusing specifically on the case of the hermaphrodite child, 
whose ‘ambiguous genitalia’ led to violent interventions of sex reassignment that sought to 
bring the materiality of the body in accordance with the gender role that the subject was to 
be socialized into. The social construction of gender was thereby supplemented with a 
physical reconstruction of bodies. 
 
Lindberg’s article locates the philosophical debates on bio- and thanatopolitics in the 
context of the governance of organ donation. Focusing on the recent amendment of the law 
on organ donation in Finland, she traces the way this apparently minor legislative change 
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leads to a fundamental reconstitution of the very notions of life and death. The paradigm of 
the brain-dead body that becomes the source of the paradoxically obligatory gift of organs 
and hence of life is impossible to subsume under either a positive theory of biopolitics of a 
Deleuzian or Negrian kind or a negative reading of the kind practiced by Agamben or 
Esposito. The negativity of the decision on death coexists in this case with the affirmation of 
life for the beneficiaries of the donation and this bipolar tension is not resolved in any 
synthesis. The article concludes with a reflection on the startling implications of this 
coexistence for our understanding of political community: while we are more accustomed to 
think of politics in terms of common praxis on the basis of the living substrate that remains 
individual or private, contemporary bio/thanatopolitical innovations rather point to a 
community of individuals that holds in common precisely this living substrate itself. 
 
Finally, Ailio’s article traces the operation of the thanatopolitical logic in liberal 
governmentality. While numerous empirical studies of liberal biopolitics highlighted its 
recourse to violent and lethal measures, theory of biopolitics tended to dissociate liberalism 
from the thanatopolitical dimension, whereby liberalism was viewed as only resorting to the 
power of death as an exception to or betrayal of liberal maxims themselves. In his article 
Ailio relies on Esposito’s account of the immunitary logic of biopolitics and his genealogy of 
the apparatus of the ‘person’ to articulate an outline of a specifically liberal thanatopolitics: 
a politics that produces death not despite but because of its commitment to liberal maxims. 
He demonstrates the operation of this logic in the contemporary global governance of the 
AIDS pandemic, which, while ostensibly and increasingly grounded in the precepts of liberal 
governmentality, abandons AIDS victims to death, precisely as a result of its operation with 
the liberal understanding of the person in terms of the subject’s control and domination of 
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the simply living being within him- or herself. Ailio’s analysis challenges the optimistic 
accounts of the shift of the governance of the AIDS pandemic towards liberal rights -based 
principles, demonstrating the way the dehumanizing effects of the disease are only 
aggravated by the humanist presuppositions of liberal governance. 
 
  
